Global emission reduction with heterogenous agents
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摘要: 基于《巴黎协定》中的自主贡献（intended nationally determined contributions）和全球盘点（global stocktake）机制，建立了带集体风险的多周期公共品博弈模型，应用子博弈精炼纳什均衡方法分析了当不同国家在禀赋、减排成本、气候风险等方面存在异质性时，能否及如何达成合作减排．研究发现，若所有国家气候风险的加权平均达到或者超过减排目标系数，则可以通过构造Grim策略使合作成为子博弈精炼纳什均衡，并且减排周期和国家数量的变化不会影响合作均衡的达成．Abstract: A multi-period public goods game model with collective risk is established, based on “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” and “Global Stocktake” mechanisms proposed in the Paris Agreement． Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium method is applied to analyze whether and how to achieve emission reduction target when developed and developing countries have heterogeneity in endowment, emission reduction costs, and climate risk． If the weighted average of climate risk of all countries reaches or exceeds the coefficient of emission reduction target, then global cooperation can be the outcome of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium through the Grim strategy． Further, emission reduction period and numbers of developed and non-developed countries do not affect global cooperation．
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图 1 合作子博弈精炼纳什均衡处的减排投入
注：横轴为非发达国家总减排投入，纵轴为发达国家总减排投入；线段AG代表所有刚好达到目标$ D $的减排投入组合，由条件1）决定；线段BD和DF分别代表发达和非发达国家在特定风险组合下的减排投入上限，由条件2）决定；线段CE表示该减排投入组合为合作QSPNE，空心圆E表示社会总福利实现了最大化．参数设定为$ {E}_{R}= 20,{E}_{P}=4,s=2,{N}_{1}=1,{N}_{2}=5,\beta =0.5 $．a. $ {r}_{R}={r}_{P}=0.8 $；b.$ {r}_{R}={r}_{P}=0.5 $；c.$ {r}_{R}={r}_{P}=0.2 $．
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