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带有异质性的国家间合作减排问题研究

黄银丹 王晓敏 张博宇 董雅丽

黄银丹, 王晓敏, 张博宇, 董雅丽. 带有异质性的国家间合作减排问题研究[J]. 北京师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2023, 59(5): 806-811. doi: 10.12202/j.0476-0301.2023054
引用本文: 黄银丹, 王晓敏, 张博宇, 董雅丽. 带有异质性的国家间合作减排问题研究[J]. 北京师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2023, 59(5): 806-811. doi: 10.12202/j.0476-0301.2023054
HUANG Yindan, WANG Xiaomin, ZHANG Boyu, DONG Yali. Global emission reduction with heterogenous agents[J]. Journal of Beijing Normal University(Natural Science), 2023, 59(5): 806-811. doi: 10.12202/j.0476-0301.2023054
Citation: HUANG Yindan, WANG Xiaomin, ZHANG Boyu, DONG Yali. Global emission reduction with heterogenous agents[J]. Journal of Beijing Normal University(Natural Science), 2023, 59(5): 806-811. doi: 10.12202/j.0476-0301.2023054

带有异质性的国家间合作减排问题研究

doi: 10.12202/j.0476-0301.2023054
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71922004,72091511,72103021,72131003);北京市自然科学基金重点资助项目(Z220001)
详细信息
    通讯作者:

    董雅丽(1987—),女,博士,讲师. 研究方向:人类复杂行为系统、气候系统和经济系统以及3个系统之间的相互影响. E-mail:dongyali@bnu.edu.cn

  • 中图分类号: F224.32

Global emission reduction with heterogenous agents

  • 摘要: 基于《巴黎协定》中的自主贡献(intended nationally determined contributions)和全球盘点(global stocktake)机制,建立了带集体风险的多周期公共品博弈模型,应用子博弈精炼纳什均衡方法分析了当不同国家在禀赋、减排成本、气候风险等方面存在异质性时,能否及如何达成合作减排.研究发现,若所有国家气候风险的加权平均达到或者超过减排目标系数,则可以通过构造Grim策略使合作成为子博弈精炼纳什均衡,并且减排周期和国家数量的变化不会影响合作均衡的达成.

     

  • 图  1  合作子博弈精炼纳什均衡处的减排投入

    注:横轴为非发达国家总减排投入,纵轴为发达国家总减排投入;线段AG代表所有刚好达到目标$ D $的减排投入组合,由条件1)决定;线段BDDF分别代表发达和非发达国家在特定风险组合下的减排投入上限,由条件2)决定;线段CE表示该减排投入组合为合作QSPNE,空心圆E表示社会总福利实现了最大化.参数设定为$ {E}_{R}= 20,{E}_{P}=4,s=2,{N}_{1}=1,{N}_{2}=5,\beta =0.5 $.a. $ {r}_{R}={r}_{P}=0.8 $;b.$ {r}_{R}={r}_{P}=0.5 $;c.$ {r}_{R}={r}_{P}=0.2 $.

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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2023-04-09
  • 录用日期:  2023-04-09
  • 网络出版日期:  2023-09-14
  • 刊出日期:  2023-10-31

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